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Who actually benefits from changes in legal standards?
Evidence from water disputes in 19th century California
I: Introduction
This paper attempts to answer a fundamental question about the effect of a change in a
legal standard on the parties to a dispute: How do we know who is benefited by a change in a
legal standard? The answer to this question may seem obvious, particularly if you state it
concretely: Who will benefit from a change in a legal standard that is more likely to find drivers
at fault in automobile-pedestrian collisions?1 Surely the answer is pedestrians. Stated more
generally, how do we know that a rule change that seems to benefit a class of parties to a dispute
actually does?
The answers to these questions are perhaps not as obvious as they seem. The reason is
that litigants are only a potentially small fraction of the total universe of parties to legal disputes,
as legal scholars have long recognized. In particular, many disputes are never brought to trial or
even if brought to trial, are quickly settled.2 When settlement is a possibility, the distributional
impact of changes in legal standards becomes murkier. Changes in standards that appear to
benefit plaintiffs could in fact benefit defendants if more cases that would have been litigated
under the old rule are now settled.3 Put plainly, being able to avoid costly litigation might confer
benefits on both plaintiffs and defendants, while the division of those benefits under a settlement
depends upon various factors, such as the strength of the case, the stringency of prevailing
standards of proof, whether the negotiations are one-shot or repeated, private information
possessed by either party, and the bargaining positions and strengths of the respective parties.4
It is unlikely that there is one answer to these questions that applies across all types of
changes in legal standards. Changes in standards can vary in their impact on the propensity to
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settle rather than litigate, depending upon the context. An important issue is the impact of the
changing standard on the uncertainty experienced by parties to a dispute regarding how the new
rule will be applied. One can imagine changes that increase uncertainty because the new
standards are doctrinally novel or complex. In this case, we may well see an increase in the
incidence of litigation. However, one can also imagine changes that reduce uncertainty because
the new standards are simpler and easier to interpret, in which case the incidence of litigation
may well go down.5 This fact makes answering the question of the effect of changes in legal
standards an empirical one.
The general notion of clarifying vs. muddling standards, as I shall call them, has a
specific analogy in some property law scholarship. Not all legal standards are about rights to
property, of course, but many are. And as property law theorists have pointed out, legal rules
exist that either clarify entitlements to property or muddle those entitlements, what Carol Rose
has called “crystal” rules and “mud” rules.6 This implies that it may be possible to examine
changes in the legal treatment of property to shed light on the more general question of who
benefits and who loses from changes in legal standards.
An important advantage of pursuing this strategy is that many species of property are
exchanged in markets and therefore have a particular market-determined value associated with
them. One obstacle to determining the impact of changes in legal standards has been a dearth of
compelling evidence. Though we can generally obtain detailed information on litigated cases,
this is often not true for cases that are settled. Using a novel data set, for example, George Priest
has proposed a measure of legal change based on changes in settlement offers, but these data
may be difficult to come by.7 In this paper, I propose to use market-generated data in order to
answer the question of who benefits and who loses from changes in legal standards.
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This paper examines the effect of changing legal standards within the context of surface
water rights in 19th-century California. During this period, California water law underwent a
major evolution, associated with major sectoral transformations in the state economy.8 Over a
span of several decades, the California courts dealt with a wide range of complex issues
concerning the relative water rights of competing claimants. This paper focuses on the effects of
perhaps the single most important water case decided by the California Supreme Court during
this period: the landmark 1886 ruling Lux v. Haggin, which embodied a major shift in the legal
standard governing the relative rights of important classes of water users.9
The Lux ruling seems particularly apropos for studying the distributional impacts of
changes in legal standards, as it has been the subject of an ongoing debate among historians and
legal scholars regarding its true impact on the California water law. Some have argued that it
resulted in a great deal of legal uncertainty and interfered with economic growth.10 On the other
hand, I and others have argued that it may have had some efficiency-enhancing properties, by
permitting courts to employ rules that economize on transaction and information costs.11 Which
is the more appropriate characterization remains unclear to this day because to my knowledge,
no systematic analysis of its effects has ever been undertaken.
In the next section, I develop the theoretical predictions regarding the predicted effects of
a change in a legal standard on the propensity of competing claimants to litigate, rather than
settle, their disputes. In section III, I then discuss the historical context of surface water law in
19th century California, and place Lux v. Haggin within this context. Section IV contains an
analysis of data on water disputes filed in the superior courts of Tulare, Fresno, and Kern
counties during the 1880’s and early 1890’s. This analysis shows that the Lux ruling had two
related effects on water litigation. First, it reduced the number of actions brought in water
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conflicts involving a similar pattern of facts. Second, among the actions brought, it increased the
propensity to settle rather than take the case to trial. These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that in an important class of water conflicts, the Lux ruling clarified the legal standard
regarding the level of permissible damages. In doing so, it effectively reduced prevailing
uncertainty regarding the property rights of different categories of claimants.
In section V, I provide further qualitative evidence from various superior court cases
brought in three California counties that are consistent with these findings. Then, in section VI, I
directly address the question of who benefited from the Lux ruling by examining evidence from
actual land and water deeds. This evidence suggests that claimants in one key category enjoyed
an observable increase in the value of their lands after Lux, as would be predicted if Lux resolved
legal uncertainty regarding property rights in their favor. Finally, in section VII, I conclude and
present potential avenues of future research.
II: Legal standards, litigation, and settlement
To model the effect of a change in a legal standard, I assume the dispute is over a tort
allegedly inflicted by one party on another. I assume that there is a single-dimension index of
provable damages D, and that each dispute may be fully described by the amount of such
damages inflicted on one of the parties, which is represented as a value of this index.12 Prior to
the court ruling in question, there is a court-chosen threshold level of damages DPRE – the legal
standard – which demarcates the maximum allowable inflicted damages for which the defendant
is not held liable. That is, the plaintiff A recovers from the defendant B only when actual
damages exceeds DPRE. Both A and B are assumed to know the value of this threshold damage
level. In any given dispute, there is some actual amount of damages inflicted, which I denote
DACT. Both A and B make a subjective assessment of these damages, based upon the particulars
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of the case. However, these damage assessments are subject to uncertainty, perhaps because it
may be unclear how B’s action will be translated into actual damages to A. Specifically, A and
B each ascribe unbiased estimates of damages DA and DB, respectively, of:
DA = DACT + eA

(1a)

DB = DACT + eB

(1b)

where the error terms are normally distributed with expected value of zero and some constant
variance. For simplicity, assume the variances are equal, so that: eA, eB ~ N(0, s2). Together
with (1a) and (1b), this immediately implies that DA, DB ~ N(DACT, s2)
Consider now the situation of one or the other parties to the dispute; say, the plaintiff.
Based upon his subjective assessment of the amount of damages suffered, he will formulate a
probability PA that he will prevail should his case go to trial, where PA depends upon the
relation-ship between his subjective damage estimate DA and the legal standard DPRE. Figure 1
shows how this probability is assessed for one particular legal standard, DPRE*. In Figure 1, PA
equals the area labelled PA under the distribution to the right of DPRE*; that is, PA is A’s
subjective probability that actual damages exceeds the legal standard. It should be apparent that
given any existing legal standard, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the plaintiff’s
subjective estimate of damages and his subjective probability of prevailing in trial. A similar
argument, of course, holds for the defendant. I will denote as PB the subjective probability
ascribed by the defendant B that he will prevail in trial.
Now consider the entire population of possible plaintiffs, each subject to uncertainty
regarding the actual level of provable damages in his particular dispute. Specifically, assume
that the error term eA of each plaintiff is independent and identically (normally) distributed.
With randomness in the process of assessing damages, each plaintiff may choose a different DA*,
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and thus, a different probability PA. This implies that for the population of plaintiffs, there will
be a distribution of probabilities f(PA), as shown in Figure 2, which is obviously a function of the
legal standard DPRE. In a given dispute, I assume that the plaintiff is randomly drawn from this
distribution. A similar process is occurring on the defendant side, resulting in a similar distribution g(PB).13
Given this prediction on the effect of a change in the legal standard on the probabilities
PA and PB, the question is how a change in the standard for liability for damages would affect the
propensity to litigate. To answer this question, consider the following game-theoretic model of
litigation, which captures the essential elements of the possible strategies available to both
plaintiffs and defendants.14 Plaintiff A is currently deriving value (economic profit) of VA from
enjoyment of his property. Defendant B locates nearby and inflicts damages on A. In doing so,
B derives value of VB. Assume B’s activities would damage A in the amount of D. Assume that
VB > VA and VA ³ D.
If A is damaged, he must decide whether to file suit, or take no action. If A takes no
action, then B enjoys value of VB and A receives value of (VA – D), in perpetuity. If A files suit,
B must decide whether to settle out of court or take the case to trial. Both litigation and
negotiation to settle involve certain costs being borne by both A and B. For simplicity, assume
that they each incur the same costs: C if they litigate, and CN if they negotiate. Since litigation is
costly, assume C > CN. Two key parameters underlying this model are PA and PB, the respective
probabilities ascribed by A and B that they will prevail should the case go to trial. As described
earlier, in any given dispute these probabilities are selected by a random draw from the existing
distribution of probabilities for the population of plaintiffs and defendants. Both A and B are
assumed to be risk-neutral.
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The extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 3. If B decides to settle, then A and B
negotiate over the division of total rents (VB + VA – D). Their shares of the gains depend upon
their relative bargaining strengths, which is represented by the parameter a, where a represents
A’s share, and a e [0, 1]. Thus, in settlement negotiations, A receives a(VB + VA – D), and B
receives (1 – a)(VB + VA – D). They also both incur costs of CN.
On the other hand, if B decides not to settle and the case goes to trial, then both parties
are taking their chances with a probabilistic outcome. The expected value to A of carrying a
dispute through to trial (that is, the value at the litigation node L in Figure 3) is: VA – (1 – PA)D –
C, while the expected value to B is (PBVB – C). Settlement occurs when the value to B of
settlement is greater than B’s expected value of litigation; that is, when (1 – a)(VB + VA – D) –
CN > (PBVB – C). Solving for PB yields a litigation threshold value of PB, above which B will
choose to litigate:
PB = [(1 – a)(VB + VA – D) + (C – CN)] / VB

(2)

Interpreting this condition, we can readily see that all else equal, B has greater incentive to
litigate when: he has a relatively weak negotiating position [α large]; when the gains from trade
from negotiation are small [(VB + VA – D) small]; when his stakes are high [VB large]; and/or
when the costs of litigation are relatively small [(C – CN) small].
Depending on whether he expects B to litigate or settle, A must decide whether or not to
file suit. If A expects B to litigate, then A will only file suit if his expected returns from filing
suit exceed his returns from not filing suit, or: VA – (1 – PA)D – C > VA – D. Solving for PA, we
derive the following threshold probability of PA, below which A will not file suit:
PA = C/D

(3)

This simple condition says that A will be more likely to file suit when the cost of litigation is
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small relative to the damages being incurred [C/D small]. Notice also that if litigation costs
exceed damages, A will never have incentive to file suit [C/D > 1].
Perhaps not surprisingly, if A expects B to settle, whether or not he chooses to file suit
does not depend upon PA. In this case, he files suit if his expected returns under settlement
exceed his returns if he does not file suit, or: a(VB + VA – D) – CN > VA – D. To understand this
condition, let us solve for CN:
a(VB + VA – D) – (VA – D) > CN

(4)

If equation (4) is satisfied, then A has incentive to file suit. This condition indicates that all else
equal, A will file suit when: his bargaining position is strong [a large]; the potential gains from
trade are large [(VB + VA – D) large]; the value of his operation net of damages is small [(VA –
D) small] and/or when negotiating costs are small [CN small].
Figure 4 shows the values of PA and PB which will result in litigation and settlement in
Nash equilibrium, as functions of important parameters of the model. Broadly speaking, litigation occurs when PA and PB are simultaneously high; that is, when A and B are both optimistic
that they will win. On the other hand, settlement tends to occur when B is not optimistic about
his chances [PB low]. It should be noted that even when PB is low, there is no guarantee that A
will file suit: A has incentive to file suit only if condition (4) is satisfied. Thus, depending on the
values of the parameters in (4), when PB is low, the Nash equilibrium can be either “A files, B
settles” or “A does not file.” In either case, of course, there is no litigation.
In this model, the effect of a change in a legal standard may be represented as a
simultaneous change in PA and PB in which one increases and the other decreases, depending
upon the nature of the standard and the direction of the change (See Figure 5). Importantly for
our purposes, a change in a legal standard that favors the plaintiff A (and thus, simultaneously
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disfavors the defendant B) will tend to result in a greater incidence of Nash equilibria in the
settlement region, particularly among cases that might have been borderline candidates for
litigation prior to the legal change (that is, close to the dashed vertical line).
III: 19th century California water law
The late 19th century was an extremely important formative period for California surface
water law. Beginning immediately after statehood in 1850, the courts began to design a system
of water rights to serve the developmental demands of the state economy. The first major demand occurred during the Gold Rush, when miners began to use large amounts of water after the
development of hydraulic mining techniques in the early 1850’s.15 It is well-known that
increased demand for water gave rise, in the 1850’s, to a series of important rulings in which the
California Supreme Court created a workable system for establishing, maintaining, and
alienating surface water rights, which became known as the system of prior appropriation.16
For the purposes of this paper, there are two important things to keep in mind about
appropriative rights. First, water for mining was typically used at locations physically removed
from the water source and consequently, appropriative rights were rights to divert and thus, to
deprive downstream users of water. Second, every appropriative right was for a specific quantity
and carried with it a priority date, essentially the point in time when a water claim was filed (and
then subsequently developed). Rights perfected earlier in time (senior rights) were satisfied first,
meaning that earlier claimants received their full entitlement before later claimants (holding
junior rights) could receive theirs. These two features of appropriative rights conferred a
considerable advantage on miners who managed to stake their water claims early, especially
during the inevitable episodes of drought that occurred with some regularity.
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One might be tempted to interpret the development of appropriative rights during the California Gold Rush as a simple example of increasingly explicit and well-defined property rights
occurring in response to increases in the value of water.17 The reality was, however, much more
complicated. Most importantly, the California courts operated within a legal environment in
which it had been legislatively mandated that they apply principles of English common law to,
among other things, craft the various features of water rights.18 This led to the early recognition
of water rights based on a very different doctrine: riparian law, which governed water rights under English common law.
Under riparian law, land ownership conferred the right to use water in physically adjacent
waterways. However, water could not be diverted for use on non-riparian lands because all
riparian landowners enjoyed coequal rights in the waterway. This meant that riparian rights were
not well-suited for mining, as many claims were physically removed from existing waterways.
Furthermore, the fact that no user enjoyed temporal priority of claim over other users meant that
riparian rights varied as water supply conditions fluctuated. This would probably have discouraged investment in water development, as potential developers would not know how much water
they were entitled to.
It should be apparent that riparian and appropriative rights constitute starkly different,
and seemingly incompatible, types of property rights. How could both arise under one system of
law? The key particular circumstance in California that permitted both kinds of rights to emerge
was the fact that lands in the state began as part of the public domain. During the Gold Rush, the
mining regions were all on public lands belonging to the federal government. In allowing miners
to appropriate water on a first-come, first-served basis, the courts sought to accommodate their
need for property rights that were secure. They found doctrinal basis for such rights in the Eng-
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lish common law principle of presumption of grant. Since the federal government had taken no
action to assert its rights to the mining regions, the courts argued, it could be presumed that it
was acquiescing in their occupation by miners. Under such circumstances, claimants had rights
superior to subsequent claimants. However, all claimants could be displaced if the government,
as the true owner, ever asserted its claim. The courts were able to cite ample precedent from
English cases to support this contention.19
Riparian rights, on the other hand, derived from grants of public lands made to private
citizens under the several disposal acts that comprised federal land disposal policy. As we have
seen, under English common law the fundamental basis for riparian rights was ownership of
adjacent land. The courts argued that the federal government was the owner of the public lands
when California was admitted to statehood and as such, enjoyed riparian rights to all nonnavigable waterways thereon. These riparian rights were conveyed to private citizens when
those lands were disposed of, unless expressly reserved in the terms of the grant. For state courts
to deny that riparian rights were conveyed was to interfere with the right of the federal
government to dispose of the public lands.
The public lands basis for defining riparian and appropriative rights also served well in
resolving disputes early on between riparians and appropriators. Because early court cases
involved disputes among miners during the Gold Rush, the courts took advantage of the fact that
almost all mining took place on public lands to affirm the primacy of appropriative rights when
in conflict with riparian rights. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court(Court) is illustrated in the landmark case of Irwin v. Phillips, involving precisely such a dispute, between
miners locating along the banks of a stream and an upstream ditch owner diverting the stream to
supply miners with water. In Irwin the Court ruled for the ditch owner on the basis that he was
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there first, the doctrinal justification being that the miners were not entitled to a riparian right
because they did not own their lands. Existing cases upholding riparian rights, the Court argued,
did not apply here because the riparian doctrine was “found to rest upon the fact of the individual
rights of landed proprietors upon the stream.”20
Because the Irwin court made much of the fact that the dispute took place on public
lands, the Irwin ruling, and other early rulings that upheld appropriative rights when in conflict
with riparian rights, left open the crucial question of whose rights took precedence on privatelyowned lands. This omission became increasingly important over time as lands steadily passed
into private hands through a series of acts passed by Congress calling for disposal of the public
lands. By 1870, at least (?) acres of land in the Central Valley had passed into private
ownership, and the privatization process continued in subsequent decades. Furthermore, after
1870 irrigated agriculture began to increase dramatically. The spread of irrigation techniques
increased agricultural demand for water, especially in the southern San Joaquin Valley, where
irrigation proved to be particularly advantageous.21 It was thus only a matter of time before the
courts would be forced to address the issue of whether or not appropriative rights took
precedence over riparian rights on private lands.
In the late 1870’s, a series of disputes on private lands involving appropriators and riparians began to make their way to the state Supreme Court. This type of dispute had no good precedent in English common law, and the courts struggled to apply established legal principles to a
novel set of circumstances. Through the early 1880’s, the Court responded essentially by favoring riparian claims, typically enjoining appropriations which deprived riparians of the use of
surface waters. However, these early rulings typically provided little explanation of the doctrinal
basis for such rulings. In the 1878 case of Creighton v. Evans, for example, the Court issued a
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one-paragraph ruling in which it simply declared that the defendant, an appropriator, was “not
entitled to divert the water for any purpose”, but did not explain why.22 And though the Court
was a bit more forthcoming the following year in Pope v. Kinman, stating that “under settled
principles, ... the riparian proprietor has a usufruct in the stream as it passes over his land”, it did
not elaborate much, seeming to assume that the implied primacy over the competing appropriator
was self-evident.23
Such terse rulings, though nominally pro-riparian, did not settle the relative legal status of
riparian and appropriative rights. Consequently, there was much public uncertainty during the
early 1880’s regarding how the courts were likely to continue to resolve disputes involving
competing riparians and appropriators. Newspaper editorials in the Tulare-Kern-Fresno region
were regarding the issue as an open one, sometimes taking the position that the courts were
unlikely to continue to uphold riparian rights.24 Pisani recounts that as late as 1885, many state
legislators were arguing that the Court might well reverse its earlier pro-riparian position.25
Throughout this period, the rhetoric of anti-riparians often contained references to “reconstructing” or “reorganizing” the Court if it failed to deny the legitimacy of riparian rights, implying
that by doing so its earlier rulings could be reversed.26
However, in 1886 the state Supreme Court handed down a carefully-argued, extremely
lengthy (over 200 pages) ruling in the landmark case of Lux v. Haggin. Lux pitted a downstream
riparian, the Miller-Lux corporation, against an upstream appropriator, James Haggin. MillerLux claimed riparian rights to the Kern River dating from the 1850's, water which was used by
Miller-Lux for watering cattle. In the mid-1870's, Haggin began to divert water upstream for
irrigation. When drought occurred at the end of the decade, many cattle belonging to Miller-Lux
died, and the firm filed suit. In 1881, the superior court of Kern County found for Haggin, partly
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on the basis that riparian rights were not entirely suitable to conditions in California, and that
denying the upstream appropriations would lead to considerable loss of economic value.27 However, on appeal the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling, affirming the riparian rights of Miller-Lux and ruling that they took precedence over the appropriative claims of
Haggin. In Lux, the Court addressed a whole host of doctrinal issues concerning the applicability
of riparian law to conditions in California and why, on doctrinal grounds, riparian rights should
enjoy primacy over appropriative rights. For the purposes of this paper, the most important
portion of the Lux ruling was summarized as follows by Justice Ross:
“In effect, the conclusion reached by the majority is, that the grantee of any legal
sub-division of the public lands of the United States or of the state, through or along
which a stream of water flows, is lawfully entitled – at least as against any one not a
riparian proprietor or previous appropriator – to have the water continue to flow in its
natural channel undiminished in quantity and unaffected in quality.”28
In other words, in such cases the Lux ruling established a legal standard of zero permissible damages that could be inflicted by an appropriator on a riparian, under certain conditions. Since the
vast majority of private lands in California derived from public land grants, Lux made it considerably more difficult for appropriators to divert surface water to the detriment of a riparian who
was already present downstream. The opinion exerted an enormous influence over subsequent
rulings involving riparians and appropriators, which almost invariably invoked the principles
established in Lux.
It is worth mentioning that the Lux Court did specify several avenues whereby water
rights could be transferred from riparian tracts. First, the Court declared that appropriative rights
could be acquired by prescription; that is, if a riparian was damaged by a diversion but did not
protest within a period of five years, then the diversion could ripen into an appropriative right.
Second, irrigation was declared a public use of water, opening up the possibility that water rights
could be acquired by condemnation, if compensation was provided. Finally, the Court allowed
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for the possibility that under certain circumstances, riparian rights could be transferred through
voluntary exchange. To the extent that these avenues were actually pursued, they may have mitigated any impact that Lux may have had in tying water to riparian lands.
What are we to make of Lux? Among historians and legal scholars, though differing in
certain details, there is general consensus that Lux exerted an adverse impact on the rational
development of water use in early California. Eric Freyfogle (1986), for example, one of its
harshest critics, has characterized the opinion as profoundly conservative, one that continues to
impede rational water allocation to this day.29 Others have viewed it as something of an
historical anomaly, creating a hybrid legal system with two largely incompatible types of water
rights, but not necessarily strongly anti-developmental because to some extent private responses
softened its impact.30 I have argued that the California courts may have considered differing
transactions costs in fashioning subsequent rulings in riparian-appropriative disputes, as a means
of differentially facilitating exchanges of surface water rights.31 And there is evidence that the
courts made other changes in the law to facilitate transfers from riparian claimants. The difficulty
in evaluating Lux is that existing studies contain virtually no quantitative evidence regarding how
private actors actually responded to the ruling.
IV: Did Lux Reduce Litigation Between Riparians and Appropriators?
In this section, I provide quantitative evidence that the Lux ruling altered the nature and
extent of litigation over surface water rights, in a manner consistent with the model of section II.
This evidence is based on cases involving water disputes collected from the superior courts of
Tulare, Fresno, and Kern counties from 1879 through the mid-1890’s.32 I have collected over
300 cases involving a variety of types of disputes over water. These disputes encompass a
variety of issues, including damages inflicted by upstream diversions, damages from canal

17
overflow, right-of-way disputes, non-delivery of water by mutual companies, and non-payment
for water delivered. Of these, 104 cases involve alleged damages to riparians caused by
diversions by upstream appropriators. The data set includes all water-related cases filed, but not
necessarily tried, in court. In fact, most cases were either dropped or settled out of court: in only
fifty-one cases did the superior court issue an actual ruling. A superior court ruling was issued in
twenty of the 104 cases involving riparians and appropriators. Of these twenty rulings, twelve
were subsequently appealed to the California Supreme Court.
Figure 6 reports data on the number of riparian-appropriator suits filed, tried in the
superior courts of these three counties, and appealed to the California Supreme Court for the
years 1879 through 1895. This evidence indicates several things. First, after 1886 we observe a
reduction in the number of suits filed. This is true even if we exclude the data from 1885, which
is an obvious outlier in this data set. From 1879 through 1884, the average number of riparianappropriator suits filed per year was 3.83; from 1887 through 1895, this average fell to 2.56.
Second, after 1886 there is a reduction in the percentage of suits filed that actually go to
trial, suggesting a greater incidence of out-of-court settlements. This change is even more
dramatic: between the period 1879-1884 and 1887-1895, the percentage of suits filed that go to
trial decreases from 60.9% to 21.7%. All of this evidence is consistent with the following
interpretation of the model of the previous section: after Lux, claimants expected riparians to
become more likely to prevail in disputes with appropriators. To the extent that this occurred,
fewer suits would have been litigated as appropriators either avoided inflicting damages on
riparians [D decreasing] or became increasingly willing to settle out of court [PA increasing, PB
decreasing].
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A third suggestive fact is that beginning in 1885, the incidence of appeals to the Supreme
Court in riparian-appropriator cases essentially disappeared. Prior to 1885, the Supreme Court
heard a dozen appeals, an average of two per year after 1879. This fact suggests that in the early
1880’s, the courts were experiencing a significant amount of uncertainty in how to deal with
disputes between riparians and appropriators. The fact that there were literally no appeals after
1886 implies that the issue of riparian primacy became much less contentious and controversial
after that date.
One interpretive issue with the raw data reported in Figure 6 is that it does not control for
other factors that could exacerbate disputes between riparian and appropriator claimants. One
obvious such factor is water availability: one might expect, for example, the number of disputes
to increase during years of below-normal precipitation. To allow for this possibility, I performed
some estimations in which the number of riparian-appropriator disputes per year is regressed
against a water availability indicator PRECIP, a dummy variable LUXDUMMY which equals one
after 1886 and zero before, and a time trend. PRECIP is simply the number of inches of
recorded rainfall in San Bernardino, the nearest rainfall measuring station for which data is
available.33 The time trend TIME controls (imperfectly) for unobservable changing variables
that may be varying over time that systematically affect the propensity for disputes between
riparians and appropriators.
Table 1 reports the results of estimations on three dependent variables: cases filed
(FILED), cases tried (TRIED), and cases appealed to the CA Supreme Court (APPEALED).
Each variable is defined as the number of cases per year for each of the years 1879 through
1895.34 These variables are censored at zero, since FILED, TRIED, and APPEALED all can, and
sometimes do, equal zero in a given year. Therefore, the models are estimated using the Tobit
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procedure. The results indicate that after the Lux ruling, there was a significant decline in the
number of riparian-appropriator cases filed, even after controlling for water availability and other
trending variables. This is consistent with the predictions of our model regarding the propensity
to litigate. The results indicate, however, that Lux had a smaller and less significant effect on the
number of cases tried, and no detectable effect on the number of cases appealed.
By aggregating all cases in a given year, these Tobit results, though suggestive, do not
capture the effect of different circumstances at the level of individual cases. Importantly, in a
riparian-appropriator dispute, the likelihood that a case will come to trial may well depend upon
whether the appropriator can plausibly claim a prescriptive right to the water. Given the consistent affirmation by the courts of proven prescription claims by appropriators, an appropriator in a
position to make such a claim would probably ascribe a higher probability of prevailing in
court.35 In terms of the model of section II, litigation becomes a more likely Nash equilibrium
when the appropriator can claim a prescriptive right (unless the appropriator’s claim is so strong
that the riparian does not even bother to file suit).
In order to control for such a possibility in examining the effect of Lux, I performed
further analysis at the individual case level. A further advantage of performing the analysis at
the individual case level is a considerably larger data set: eighty-nine observations. In this
analysis, the dependent variable is a dummy variable LITIG equal to one if a case is litigated and
equal to zero if settled out of court. Table 2 reports the results of a series of logit estimations, in
which LITIG is regressed against PRECIP, LUXDUMMY, TIME and also a dummy variable
PRESCRIPTION which equals one if the appropriator claimed a prescriptive right and equals
zero if not. The results indicate that disputes in which the appropriator could claim a prescriptive
right were more likely to go to trial, which is consistent with the predictions of my model. In
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addition, the results suggest that disputes were more likely to be settled out of court after the Lux
ruling, which is again consistent with the previous findings. Finally, the results do not indicate
any significant time trend in the tendency to litigate, nor any significant impact of general
conditions of reduced water availability.
V: Further Evidence on Negotiation
The case files themselves contain a great deal of qualitative information which shed
further light on the incentives to litigate rather than cooperate in some fashion. Cooperative
avenues that parties to a dispute could pursue included, for example, organizing a mutual ditch
company, litigation cost-sharing, direct bilateral negotiation, arbitration, and multilateral water
sharing arrangements. The cases depict a complex interplay between litigation and cooperation
which defies easy description, but I find evidence for the following propositions. First,
cooperation appears to have occurred with some frequency, as a means of economizing on both
water development costs and transactions costs. Second, in many identifiable instances of
cooperation, none of the involved parties held claims that enjoyed clear legal precedence over
the others. Third, cooperation was more attractive, all else equal, when there were larger
numbers of competing claimants. Finally, similarly-situated claimants who were engaged in
cooperation had incentive to litigate against newcomers claiming rights of their own. All of this
seems consistent with the predictions of my model.
One striking feature of this period is the existence of a large number of mutual ditch
companies: for example, at least eighteen mutual companies were incorporated in Tulare County
during the 1870’s alone. These mutuals would appropriate water, construct a dam and mainstem canal, and supply water to member farmers. All members bought shares of stock in the
mutual, which determined how much water they were entitled to receive. This stock was
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typically trans-ferable, either to other members or to outside parties who wanted to join.
Formation of these mutuals permitted economies of scale to be realized, which were significant
given the large fixed costs typically involved in developing a surface water source. The mutuals
were also the target of numerous actions filed by riparians objecting to their upstream diversions.
However, they also served the function of litigating on behalf of members when the water
supply of the mutual was being infringed upon. A great many of the cases in the data set
involved mutual companies as either plaintiff or defendant, and often both.
Mutuals could also negotiate agreements with outside parties: again, often other mutual
companies. In 1896, for example, two mutual companies -- the Pioneer Water Company and the
Pleasant Valley Ditch Company -- negotiated an agreement to share the waters of the Tule River.
In this case, both parties were claiming appropriative rights. One interesting thing about the
agreement was that Pioneer enjoyed a right extremely senior to that of Pleasant Valley. One
might expect that under these circumstances, Pioneer would simply take its appropriation, and no
agreement would be necessary as Pleasant Valley would simply have to avoid diverting to the
detriment of Pioneer. However, also at stake was the amount of water to which Pioneer was entitled. Pioneer was claiming an amount equal to the capacity of its ditch, but it was unclear whether it was actually entitled to this amount, since appropriative rights are based not on capacity
but actual use. This uncertainty may have produced a negotiated settlement rather than avoidance of harm. Indeed, the final agreement gave Pioneer an amount considerably less than its
ditch capacity, an amount later confirmed by the superior court when it was called upon to settle
a subsequent disagreement between the two parties (Tulare #2905)36.
Riparians, too, engaged in negotiations with other parties, in one prominent instance as a
way of sharing the cost of potential litigation. In November 1879, Miller-Lux entered into an
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agreement with six other riparian landowners along the lower Kern River to share any future cost
of litigating to contest upstream appropriations. The fact that the seven riparians had very different sizes of landholdings (Miller-Lux owned nearly 37,000 acres, while their smallest riparian
partner owned 1,280 acres) and therefore, very different stakes in future litigation, could have
made it difficult to reach a cost-sharing agreement. However, to reduce negotiation costs, the
agreement stipulated that each party’s share of total costs would be proportional to the size of
their landholdings, making their expected benefits from the agreement commensurate with their
costs (Kern # 911). The objective of this agreement was obviously to economize on litigation
costs, but it had the additional effect of providing more appropriate incentives to litigate, when
litigation by any individual riparian provided public good benefits to other similarly-situated
riparians.
Submitting a dispute to arbitration was another possible way to resolve a water conflict.
In 1884, for example, a landowner Chidister and a mutual company -- Consolidated People’s
Ditch Company -- submitted a dispute over overflow damages to arbitration, where the costs of
the arbitration were to be shared by the parties (Tulare #940). The arbitrator awarded $500 in
damages to Chidister, and the entire dispute was ended quickly. However, arbitration awards
could be challenged in the courts, which sometimes defeated cooperation. This occurred, for
example, in 1892, when several mutual companies, two riparian landowners, and an irrigation
district arbitrated a division of the waters of a stretch of the Kaweah River. This involved establishing an arbitration board among themselves, consisting of five members, each representing
different parties to the dispute. An arbitrated agreement was, however, subsequently challenged
by one of the riparian owners in 1896, whereupon the Superior Court vacated the agreement.
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An example of apparently successful multilateral negotiation occurred in 1897, when
several mutual companies located along the much-litigated King’s River formally agreed to
allocate the available water among themselves. The four signatory companies -- Fresno Canal
and Irrigation Company, People’s Ditch, Last Chance Water Company, and the Lower King’s
River Ditch Company -- had been involved in litigation since at least 1880. In that year, the
latter three companies had, all on the same day, filed suit to enjoin diversions by the Fresno
Canal and Irrigation Company (Tulare #76, #77, and #78), on the basis of priority of claim. In
response, the defendant presented evidence that its claims, including the purchase of certain early
rights, predated those of any of the plaintiffs. The Superior Court, in March 1892, found that
only the defendant’s purchased rights predated those of the plaintiffs LKRDC and LCD (the suit
involving PDC apparently never made it to trial), and awarded those two companies 159 and 190
cubic feet per sec (cfs), senior to the defendant’s award of 100 cfs. This ruling was subsequently
upheld by the CA Supreme Court in September 1898.
In the meantime, however, the three prevailing ditch companies found themselves embroiled in additional suits, against the Kings River and Fresno Canal Company later in 1880, and
the 76 Land and Water Company in late-1888. The latter suit, against a decidedly junior appropriator, apparently provided impetus for the multilateral agreement, for the arrangement called
for the four companies to cooperate to prevent the wrongful diversion of any water from the
King’s River by the 76 Land and Water Company. The agreement also called for the parties to
cooperate to measure and maintain stream flow, and to share in the associated expenses. As a
result of this agreement, a total of fifteen pending suits were dismissed. Both the initial litigation
and the subsequent multilateral agreement are explainable in terms of our model. Since the appropriative rights of all four litigants dated from around the same time period – the early 1870’s
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– they probably operated under a lot of uncertainty concerning their relative rights. Our model
indicates that such a situation could easily lead to litigation. However, once their rights relative
to each other were established, they would have an interest in cooperating to preserve these
rights against newcomers.
VI: Did Lux Increase the Value of Riparian Lands?
The evidence presented in the last two sections is broadly consistent with a conclusion
that Lux constituted a shift in a legal standard in favor of one particular class of users – riparian
right-holders – in disputes with appropriators. However, it has not yet been established that Lux
actually benefited riparian users relative to appropriators, because the incidence of riparianappropriator settlements increased after the ruling. In this section, we investigate, using marketgenerated data, the possibility that the Lux ruling may have increased the value of lands riparian
to surface waterways. If the value of riparian lands in fact increased, and such an increase was
not observed in the value of otherwise comparable non-riparian lands, this would support the
hypothesis that Lux did indeed benefit riparian claimants.
The analysis in this section is based on a data set of actual transactions in land and water
from the time period surrounding Lux. This data set is comprised of roughly 500 deeds for
exchanges of tracts of land and/or water rights in Kern County involving either Miller-Lux or
Haggin as buyer or seller over the period from 1872 through 1899.37 Virtually all of the deeds
contain information on the quantity and location of land exchanged, while a smaller number of
deeds also transfer a right to a specified quantity of water, mostly as embodied in shares in
mutual companies. In addition, virtually all deeds specify a transfer price, though in many deeds
the price is set at a nominal level such as $5 or $10, obviously not a reflection of the real value of
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the asset being exchanged. After eliminating the deeds with such nominal prices, I am left with
170 observations.
Each of these deeds may be viewed as composite commodities with hedonic attributes,
including the quantity, quality, and location of land; the extent of the transferred water right, if
included in the transaction; and the Lux ruling. In the econometric analysis, we are interested in
the marginal effects of each of the hedonic attributes – especially Lux – on land value. The
dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of PACRE, where PACRE is
defined as the deed price divided by the number of acres of land transferred, in real 1891-92
dollars. PACRE is thus the per-acre price of a tract of land. The log specification is used
because of significant right skew in the distribution of PACRE, and because preliminary
regressions using PACRE showed significant heteroscedasticity, as revealed by Breusch-Pagan
tests. Histograms of ln(PACRE) indicate a substantial reduction in skewness, though
heteroscedasticity is not entirely eliminated.
As defined, ln(PACRE) will reflect the value of all important attributes of a parcel of
land, including Lux. However, the effect of Lux depends centrally upon whether or not a
particular tract of land is riparian to a waterway. In order to partition the data set into riparian
and non-riparian tracts, I examined maps of Kern County and identified all quarter-township
sections located adjacent to surface waterways.38 All transferred parcels of land located in these
adjacent sections were classified as riparian, all others were classified as non-riparian. I then
per-formed a regression analysis of the following model:
ln(PACRE) = f(LUX, WATER, Z) + u

(5)

where LUX is a dummy variable equal to one if the exchange occurred after the Lux ruling and
equal to zero before; WATER is a dummy variable equal to one if the deed included transfer of a
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water right (that is, separate from the riparian right which would naturally inhere in riparian
lands), and equal to zero otherwise; and Z is a vector of other variables that might systematically
affect the market value of a tract of land, such as generalized water availability and economic
conditions.
I defined two variables to capture the effect of changes in economic conditions. One is
the variable PROD, which is an annual index of manufacturing production for the entire United
States.39 The other is WPI, the annual wholesale price index. These variables were included to
capture the macro-impacts of general levels of economic activity and prices on the real value of
land. To capture water availability, I used the variable PRECIP, as defined in the previous
section. In some of the regressions, I included the variable ACRES, defined as the number of
acres of land exchanged in the transaction, to allow for the possibility that the price per acre
might vary with the size of the transaction. Finally, some of the regressions included a time
trend TIME, simply defined as the year in which the transaction occurred, in order to control for
unobservable temporal trends. This model was regressed separately on riparian and non-riparian
tracts.
Table 3 reports the results of a series of ordinary least squares regressions of ln(PACRE)
on various permutations of important regressors, for both riparian and non-riparian tracts. The
reported t-ratios are based on White-corrected standard errors. The key finding concerns the
impact of the Lux ruling on the per-acre prices of riparian and non-riparian lands. Most
importantly, I find a significantly positive impact of the ruling on the price of riparian land. The
results also show a smaller and less significant negative impact on the price of non-riparian land.
These findings suggest that Lux may have had a significant redistributional impact on land rents,
away from non-riparian landowners and toward riparian landowners. This finding is consistent
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with the analysis of section IV that showed a shift from litigation to settlement of riparianappropriator disputes after Lux. However, it goes further by documenting that riparians actually
enjoyed additional land rents after the ruling.
The results also show that tracts of land were significantly more valuable when they came
with water rights, as expected. This was true regardless of whether land was riparian or nonriparian, though it is interesting that the coefficient on WATER was modestly higher for nonriparian tracts. This finding suggests that there may have been greater value in a conveyance of
water for the owners of non-riparian lands, which makes sense intuitively. It is worth
mentioning that these findings control for changes in business conditions, which had significant
impacts on the value of riparian lands, particularly general price levels. On the other hand, both
prices and general business activity were relatively insignificant in affecting the value of nonriparian lands. Finally, these findings also control for short-run changes in water availability,
differences in the sizes of the land tracts exchanged, and a temporal reduction in real land prices
over time,
VII. Conclusions
This paper has proposed a method of gauging the distributional impacts of changes in
legal standards, permitting us to identify the beneficiaries of these changes, and to quantify the
magnitudes of the associated benefits. The method applied here has been specifically to land and
water prices affected by doctrinal changes in California in the late 19th century. However, in
principle the method can be applied more generally in cases where the legal standards affect the
content and clarity of rights to property that is exchanged on markets at agreed-upon prices that
reflect market value. Being able to apply the method has two requirements: a situation in which
changes in standards affect the probability that one class of claimants will prevail in disputes
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over property; and available data on actual exchanges of that genre of property and on what price
terms. Additionally, if information on litigation and settlement behavior is available, it can be
used to confirm the distributional impact of changes in legal standards.
The analysis here also provides important insights into arguably the most important water
dispute in California during the 19th century. Whereas existing studies have come to no final
consensus on the true economic impact of Lux v. Haggin and its common law legacy, we have
shown that Lux had important distributional impacts on the value of different classes of water
rights. Furthermore, by resolving legal uncertainty regarding the primacy of the different classes
of water rights, Lux decreased the legal costs associated with conflicts over the use of surface
waterways in California, encouraging more settlement of disputes and fewer appeals to the
higher court.
It is important to mention that I am not claiming to have shown that the Lux ruling, by reducing legal costs, had only unambiguously positive effects on water use efficiency. Cast in a
different light, it could be argued that Lux affirmed a species of water right which was totally
inappropriate for irrigated agriculture in California. Indeed, some critics have charged that Lux
saddled the state with an unworkable system of water law which tied surface water rights to riparian lands while the considerably more numerous non-riparian agricultural lands went without.
In fact, the subsequent history of California agriculture does not bear out this assertion. Why not
is a question that merits much more attention, but two events in the immediate aftermath of Lux
suggest two likely important areas of inquiry for future researchers.
The first was the enactment of the Wright Act in 1887, the year immediately following
the Lux ruling. The Wright Act authorized the formation of public irrigation districts that were,
among other things, empowered to condemn riparian rights within their service areas. Historians
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have portrayed the Wright Act as a populist legislative response to the unpopularity of the Lux
ruling and at the time, many had high hopes that a system of irrigation districts could rationalize
water development in the state.40 However, the irrigation district model struggled for twentyfive years until shortly before World War I, when the state enacted important reforms that
effectively fixed the irrigation district model.41 A better understanding of the early challenges
faced by irrigation districts would help us better understand the obstacles to rationalization of
water rights during this period.
Another telling event occurred immediately after Lux, which provides a suggestive
epilogue to the entire affair. Shortly after the Lux ruling, the protagonists signed an agreement
that effectively transferred two-thirds of Miller-Lux’s water right in the Kern River to Haggin, in
exchange for which Haggin agreed to share the cost of constructing a dam for Miller. In light of
this discussion, this agreement suggests the following interpretation: by clearly awarding the
property rights to Miller-Lux, the Lux ruling paved the way for a Pareto-improving exchange of
rights between the parties immediately involved in the dispute. To the extent that voluntary
transactions were pursued more broadly, surface water could have been effectively transferred to
non-riparian uses, thus servicing the growth of irrigated agriculture in non-riparian lands. A key
issue here would have been the potential existence of transaction costs that may have impeded
these transactions. Characterizing subsequent transactions through a transaction cost lens should
be the subject of future research.
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Figure 1: Choice of PA for any given legal standard and subjective damage assessments
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Figure 2: Distribution of probabilities for an entire population of potential plaintiffs
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Figure 3: Extensive form litigation game
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Figure 4: Probability conditions for settlement, litigation
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Table 1: Effect of Lux v. Haggin on Riparian-Appropriator Litigation
______________________________________________________________________________

CONSTANT

# of Cases
Filed
_______________

# of Cases
Tried
_______________

# of Cases
Appealed
_______________

6.83*** -441.93
(4.89)
(-1.03)

2.51**
(2.32)

1.32
(1.33)

LUXDUMMY
3.68
PRECIP

-3.72***

-96.53
(-0.25)

-5.73*** -3.10***

-3.58

900.48**
(2.36)
-8.39

(-3.30)

(-2.53)

(-2.66)

(-1.57)

(-0.06)

(-0.04)

-0.17**
(-2.45)

-0.18*** -0.06
(-2.57) (-1.16)

-0.07
(-1.17)

-0.02
(-0.46)

0.02
(0.48)

-

TIME

-0.24
-0.05
--0.48**
-(1.05)
-(0.25)
-(-2.36)
______________________________________________________________________________
Loglikelihood
-27.93
-27.37
-16.13
-16.09 -10.29
-7.57
______________________________________________________________________________
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
Estimation method: Tobit.
Number of observations = 16.
______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2: Effect of Lux v. Haggin on Trial versus Settlement
______________________________________________________________________________

CONSTANT
LUXDUMMY
PRECIP
PRESCRIPTION

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-432.91*
(-1.82)

-493.14**
(-2.19)

-0.12
(-0.14)

19.93
(0.15)

-3.42**
(-2.32)

-1.24
(-1.36)

---

-0.08
(-1.46)

-0.06
(-1.08)

-3.28**
(-2.23)
-0.04
(-0.85)
2.51***
(2.79)

--2.61***
(2.91)

2.37***
(2.75)

1.79**
(2.51)

TIME

0.23*
0.26**
--0.01
(1.82)
(2.18)
-(-0.15)
______________________________________________________________________________
Loglikelihood
-41.54
-41.94
-43.18
-44.26
% Correct Predictions
0.798
0.798
0.798
0.775
______________________________________________________________________________
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
Estimation method: Logit.
Number of observations = 89.
______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3: Effect of Lux v. Haggin on Riparian, Nonriparian Land Values
______________________________________________________________________________
Riparian Lands
___________________________
(N = 50)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Nonriparian Lands
___________________________
(N = 119)
(4)

(5)

(6)

CONSTANT

31.60***
(3.62)

34.85***
(3.95)

35.10***
(3.87)

10.63
(1.15)

9.16
(1.15)

10.88
(1.17)

WATER

0.70***
(3.11)

0.66***
(2.96)

0.65***
(3.02)

0.79***
(2.63)

0.78***
(2.64)

0.78**
(2.60)

LUX

1.07**
(2.36)

0.93**
(2.05)

1.02**
(2.22)

-0.46
(-1.31)

-0.49
(-1.55)

-0.45
(-1.28)

PROD

0.10
(1.65)

0.13**
(2.37)

0.12**
(2.00)

0.05
(1.02)

0.05
(1.02)

0.05
(1.08)

-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07***
(-2.78)
(-3.10)
(-3.12)

-0.02
(-0.82)

-0.02
(-0.80)

-0.02
(-0.83)

-0.01
(-1.09)

-0.02
(-1.21)

-0.00
(-0.03)

---

0.02
(0.01)

-0.36***
(-3.25)

-0.11
(-1.02)

-0.09
(-1.00)

-0.11
(-1.05)

WPI
PRECIP
TIME

---

-0.32*** -0.37***
(-2.98) (-3.52)

ACRES

-0.06
0.06
--0.02**
-0.02**
-(1.51)
(1.51)
-(-2.13)
(-2.18)
______________________________________________________________________________
R2
0.322
0.330
0.344
0.104
0.110
0.110
______________________________________________________________________________
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares, with White-corrected standard errors.
______________________________________________________________________________
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It will be recognized that this is the canonical example used in George L. Priest and
Benjamin Klein, The selection of disputes for litigation, 13 J. Leg. Stud 1 (1984); George L.
Priest, Measuring legal change, 3 J. Law, Econ, and Org 193 (1987).
2
George L. Priest, Selective characteristics of litigation, 9 J. Leg. Stud 399 (1980); Priest
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